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Abstract
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
equality. However critics argue that allowing responsibility to play this role has objectionably 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is not excessive, or by identifying allegedly legitimate exclusions from the default responsibility-
tracking rule to tone down that harshness. And in response, critics respectively deny that this 
harshness is not excessive, or they argue that those exclusions would be ineffective or lacking in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of carrying on the debate – i.e. as a debate about whether the harsh demands of responsibility 
outweigh other considerations, and about whether exclusions to responsibility-tracking 
?????????????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
responsibility do not – in fact, they can not – conflict with the demands of other normative 
considerations, because responsibility only provides a formal structure within which those other 
considerations determine how people may be treated, but it does not generate its own practical 
demands.
Keywords: responsibility, distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, public health policy, 
alcoholism, smoking.
1. Luck Egalitarianism, Public Health Policy 
and The Appeal of Tracking Responsibility
Intuitively, it seems right that a gambler who gambles 
away all of their money and is now living in squalor 
should have a weaker entitlement to claim benefits to 
remedy their poverty than someone else who was born 
into poverty, and the reason for this seems to be that 
the gambler is presumably more responsible for their 
own deprivation than the person who was born into it. 
Whether gamblers are indeed responsible for their own 
???????????????????????????? ??????? ???????????????????? ???
rather that if we think them responsible for their own 
financial difficulties then we will likely also think that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to bail them out of those difficulties than others who 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
strife.
Arguably, the same underlying intuition about how 
people’s entitlements should track their responsibility 
also finds expression in many versions of the luck 
egalitarian position.1 For example, to luck egalitarians 
like Eric Rakowski and Richard Arneson, responsibility 
plays a fairly straight forward regulatory role in shaping 
people’s entitlements. Rakowski believes that if someone 
is responsible for their own deprivation then they and not 
anyone else should suffer the burdens associated with 
that deprivation. This interpretation of Rakowski’s (1991) 
position is suggested by Elizabeth Anderson who argues: 
“Consider an uninsured driver who negligently makes 
1 In much luck egalitarian thinking responsibility also plays 
a role in shaping people’s duty to contribute something to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this feature is clearly visible in the cameos of Rakowski’s 
and Anderson’s positions that I provide below, as well as 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
however for the sake of readability in what follows I will 
sometimes drop the reference to this other important role that 
responsibility plays in luck egalitarian thinking, and just talk 
about its role in shaping people’s entitlements.
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an illegal turn that causes an accident with another car. 
Witnesses call the police, reporting who is at fault; the 
police transmit this information to emergency medical 
????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
the driver at fault is uninsured, they leave him to die by 
the side of the road. According to Rakowski’s doctrine, 
this action is just, for they have no obligation to give 
him [publicly funded] emergency care[; and i]f the faulty 
driver survives, but is disabled as a result, society has 
no obligation to accommodate his disability” (Anderson 
1999, 295-6).
And although Arneson’s responsibility-catering 
prioritarian account is more subtle and sophisticated 
?? ????????? ???????????? ????? ????????? ????????????????
to helping those people who are worse off and who 
were not responsible for their own deprivation over 
those who were, and that the funds used to help them 
should preferably be obtained from those who are 
better off and who were not responsible for their own 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
account people’s entitlements should still track their 
responsibility. For instance, Arneson argues that it is 
better to help the unlucky poor rather than the imprudent 
poor because the former are not responsible for their 
own deprivation, and that it is better when those who 
pay for making others better off are less rather than 
more responsible for their greater holdings because the 
former are less entitled to their holdings than the latter 
(Arneson 2000, 344). In a sense, Arneson’s responsibility 
catering prioritarianism recommends that those who are 
responsible for their own situation (whether good or bad) 
should be largely left alone wherever possible, and that 
redistribution should mainly take place between those 
who are not responsible for their own situation (again, 
whether good or bad), with resources flowing from the 
undeserving rich to the undeserving poor.
Thus, on both Rakowski’s and on Arneson’s accounts, 
it is largely automatic that if someone was responsible 
for their own deprivation then their entitlements to 
assistance should be affected because they rather than 
others should now take responsibility for it, and the 
main difference between their positions is in how closely 
people’s entitlements will track their responsibility. On 
Rakowski’s account responsibility entails ineligibility to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
affects who gets priority over whom, both in terms of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????2
O t h e r s  a l s o  t h i n k  t h a t  s o m e t h i n g  l i k e  t h e 
responsibility-tracking intuition sits at the core of 
luck egalitarianism. For instance, in discussing luck 
2 More precisely, what is tracked is the extent of people’s 
responsibility, since responsibility is not a light switch (an 
on/off thing) but something that comes in degrees.
egalitarianism Susan Hurley argues that ‘[w]hen 
responsibility plays a … role in distributive justice, it 
tells us … that goods are exempt from redistribution 
to the extent to which people are responsible for them 
and that distributive justice is only concerned with 
redistributing goods that are a mater of luck for people’ 
(2002, 63). Eli Feiring summarizes this idea as follows: 
“The concern of distributive justice is ‘to eliminate so far 
as possible the impact on people’s lives of bad luck that 
falls on them through no fault or choice of their own’. 
Inequalities generated by the individual’s voluntary 
choices are, however, acceptable and do not give rise to 
redistributive claims on others. Nobody is required to 
mitigate the effects of these choices” (2008, 33). This 
also seems to be the point of Gerald Cohen’s suggestion 
that “genuine choice excuses otherwise unacceptable 
inequalities” (1989, 931), and of Ronald Dworkin’s 
distinction between “brute luck” and “option luck” 
(1981). Alexander Kaufman also attributes this intuition 
to luck egalitarians when he speaks of “[t]he luck 
egalitarian intuition that egalitarians should compensate 
only for disadvantage for which persons cannot 
reasonably be held responsible” (2004, 822). Similarly, 
Maureen Ramsay argues that luck egalitarians “share a 
common commitment to the intrinsic moral importance 
of holding people responsible for what they freely choose 
to do”, because to their mind “unequal distributive 
consequences that are due to … voluntary choices [are 
things] for which people are responsible” (2005, 434). 
And some even take a harder stance and argue that not 
only is it not necessary to eradicate such departures 
from strict equality, but that we positively ought not to 
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
himself to this position by arguing that the two aims 
of egalitarianism (i.e. choice preservation and luck 
eradication) compete with one another, and that when 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
should never?????????????????????????????????????????????
(2003).
Consequently, luck egalitarians may endorse a social 
welfare policy under which a smoker who refuses to 
quit and consequently becomes ill, would have a weaker 
entitlement to receive publicly funded medical treatment 
than someone else who suffers similar health problems 
but not due to things for which they are responsible. The 
reason why on their accounts this person’s entitlements 
would be reduced is precisely to take account of the 
fact that the smoker is allegedly responsible for their 
own deprivation whereas the other person is not.3 That 
3 I am not endorsing any particular claims here about who 
is responsible for their respective health problems and 
who is not, but rather I am only reporting that others think 
that some smokers, alcoholics and obese people are more 
responsible than others for their health problems, and that to 
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is, given the scarcity of medical resources, if some 
people must miss out on receipt of medical treatment, 
then it should surely be those who were responsible 
for their own ill health rather than those who were 
not. This seems to be the point of Arneson’s reply to 
Anderson’s critique when he urges that considerations of 
responsibility must play a role in determining people’s 
entitlements, for otherwise “some individuals [who] 
behave culpably irresponsibly, again and again, [will end 
up] draining resources that should go to other members 
of society” (Arneson 2000, 349). Claims along similar 
lines are also made about alcoholics who due to their 
excessive consumption of alcohol develop liver cirrhosis 
and now need a liver transplant; here it is claimed that 
their position on the waiting list for a liver transplant 
should be demoted in relation to others who are not 
responsible for their liver cirrhosis. This, for instance, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
given the scarcity of medical resources “entitlements 
to healthcare for a diseased condition are inversely 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
claims that “[t]his view is supported by the egalitarian 
ethic espoused by certain political philosophers [he 
names Rawls, Dworkin, Arneson and Roemer] who 
argue that society should indemnify people against poor 
outcomes that are the consequences of causes beyond 
their control, but not against outcomes ... for which 
persons are responsible” (1998, 35). Finally, similar 
claims about how some people’s entitlements should be 
reduced on account of their responsibility for their own 
ill health are also made about people who become obese 
because of poor eating habits and insufficient exercise 
and who now also need expensive medical treatment for 
such conditions as type two diabetes and coronary heart 
disease. For instance, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) claims that there are causal links between 
obesity and “increases in blood pressure, unfavourable 
cholesterol levels[,] coronary heart disease, stroke, 
diabetes mellitus, and many forms of cancer” (2002, 
9), and although they do not endorse such a hash public 
health policy, Martens (2001, 172-3) points out that this 
kind of argument could be mounted.
2. Some Arguments For and Against Luck 
Egalitarianism
???????????????????????????????????????? ????? ???? ??????????
that people should take responsibility for those things 
for which they were responsible, and that no one is 
entitled to expect others to take this responsibility for 
??????????? ??????????? ?????????????????? ???? ??????
take account of this responsibility their entitlements to utilize 
public health care resources should be reduced.
consequences excessively????????? ???? ????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
luck egalitarians perhaps find ways of legitimately 
avoiding the harshness that can’t be justified? Critics 
think either that all of this harshness is excessive, or else 
that even in their best-case scenario luck egalitarians will 
still have to endorse at least some excessive harshness; 
but luck egalitarians think that all of the harshness that 
is excessive can be avoided, and that the remaining 
harshness can be morally justified. In this section I 
will explain why I find the critics’ complaints to be 
ultimately unconvincing or misguided, but why the luck 
???????????????????????????????????? ???????????
2.1. !e Critics’ Complaints and some Problems 
with those Complaints
Most objections to luck egalitarianism fall into one of 
four groups: (i) harshness objections, (ii) disagreements 
about the extent of people’s responsibility or about 
our ability to know that extent, (iii) claims that luck 
egalitarianism would be intrusive or wasteful, or that 
choice and luck are too intertwined to ever be untangled 
from one another, and (iv) claims that medical decisions 
(e.g. about organ transplants) should be made purely on 
the basis of clinical considerations.
Firstly, ever since Elizabeth Anderson’s (1999) 
influential  paper,  cri t ics have argued that luck 
egalitarianism is excessively harsh and thus morally 
unattractive, because it would be awful to abandon 
someone in their time of need and to offer them little 
or even no aid just because they were responsible for 
their own current plight. Anderson asks “If much recent 
academic work defending equality had been secretly 
penned by conservatives, could the results be any 
more embarrassing for egalitarians?” (1999, 287), and 
in response she charges luck egalitarians with having 
lost sight of truly egalitarian aims such as addressing 
“the concerns of the politically oppressed”; redressing 
“inequalities of race, gender, class and caste”; and 
eradicating “nationalist genocide, slavery and ethnic 
subordination” (Anderson 1999, 288).4
However, this criticism seems weak because the 
luck egalitarian’s point is not that it is nice to abandon 
someone who has fallen on hard times (even if this is 
due to their own bad choices), but it is rather that these 
people have no entitlement or claim on the rest of us as 
a matter of justice ???????? ??????????? ????????????????
Rakowski’s and Arneson’s position in the passages that 
were quoted earlier. Whether there are other reasons to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
the point, because the luck egalitarian’s rather minimal 
position is that equal treatment qua equal does not entail 
4 For recent expressions of this worry see (e.g. Voigt 2007, 
394; or Cappelen and Norheim 2005, 477).
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that we must eradicate all departures from strict equality, 
but only those departures for which those people who are 
affected by them are not responsible, and that nobody has 
a legitimate claim on the rest of society as a matter of 
justice to eradicate their voluntary disadvantages (e.g. see 
Kaufman 2004, 830). Thus, although Anderson claims 
that such severe responsibility-based disentitlement 
clauses are inegalitarian because they fail to take up the 
cause of the needy, those luck egalitarians who endorse 
such disentitlement clauses will probably not be swayed 
by Anderson’s appeal to our sympathy since they will see 
such harshness as merely an expression of the plausible 
intuition which lies at the heart of all luck egalitarian 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of people’s choices, but only once those choices have 
been cleansed of the distorting effects of luck (e.g. 
see Markovits 2003; or Vincent 2006a), or what I also 
referred to above as the responsibility-tracking intuition 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
inegalitarian about their recommendations, even if there 
is something cold, stark and uncaring about them.
Secondly, many critics have also argued that the 
people whom luck egalitarians identify as legitimate 
candidates for harsh treatment were actually not (fully) 
???????????? ???? ????????????????????????? ???? ??????????
they argue that alcoholics who now need a liver 
transplant due to alcohol-induced liver cirrhosis are not 
(fully) responsible for the fact that they now need a liver 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
really know the extent of their responsibility for their 
own deprivations. Here, the addictive nature of tobacco 
and alcohol, the unavailability of reasonably priced 
healthy food alternatives as well as the proliferation of 
unhealthy but inexpensive junk food (and advertisements 
for such), and the declining number of public parks 
and other recreational facilities in large and densely 
populated cities where people could engage in physical 
activity, are among the most commonly cited reasons for 
why these people are allegedly not fully responsible for 
their own ill health or for why we face epistemic barriers 
in trying to ascertain the degree of their responsibility 
(e.g. Buyx 2008, 873; Steinbrook 2006; Banja 2004).
However, this way of defending the interests of 
those whom luck egalitarians would otherwise abandon 
is also unsatisfying. One reason for this is that it is 
surely implausible to maintain that these people bear 
absolutely no responsibility whatsoever for their 
?????????????????????????????? ?????????? ????? ??????????????
with liver cirrhosis is no different at all as regards 
their responsibility for their current ill health than 
someone whose liver packs it in due to a genetic liver 
???????????????????????????????? ????? ??? ???????????? ??????
which opponents of this harsh policy would have to 
maintain if they really wished to establish that these 
people should be treated no worse than victims of bad 
luck. But secondly, even if it were not implausible to 
suppose that these people are completely innocent, the 
other reason why I do not think that this is a promising 
line of argument for the critics is because if I get their 
sentiments right, then their concern is not just to establish 
that everyone who is not responsible for their own ill 
health should be cared for properly under the public 
health system, because this is not something that luck 
egalitarians would take issue with.5 Rather, their core 
concern is surely that we should not abandon even those 
who are responsible for their own ill health, and that the 
public health system should take just as good care of 
them as it does of those people who are not responsible 
for their own ill health. And if I am right in thinking that 
this is their core concern, then the debate about whether 
alcoholics, smokers and the obese are in fact responsible 
for their health problems or not is quite peripheral 
(though not unimportant), since the real issue is not what 
should happen to those people who are not responsible 
for their own ill health, but rather what should happen 
to those people who are responsible (or who are partly 
responsible) for their own ill health. Put another way, 
the real question is who should take responsibility for 
what Cohen might call voluntary disadvantages (e.g. see 
??????????????????? ????? ??????????????????????????????
the affected parties are? ?????????????????????????????
is that even if we took on board what the critics say 
about various responsibility-undermining factors, we 
would still have to abandon some people to a harsh fate 
when their disadvantages are voluntary, because this 
objection leaves intact the idea that people should take 
responsibility for their own voluntary disadvantages.
Thirdly, critics have also argued: (a) that a luck 
egalitarian society would be terribly intrusive, since the 
state would need to send out inspectors to periodically 
check on everyone to see whether they had been the 
beneficiaries of some undeserved good fortune or the 
victims of undeserved bad luck; (b) that all of this 
checking would be very wasteful, because too great an 
administrative cost would need to be borne by society to 
??????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
pull apart those effects which are due to people’s choices 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not be done because our choices are far too intertwined 
with luck for them to ever be pulled apart from one 
another. Elizabeth Anderson levels the first charge 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
egalitarian theories (see the end of the next paragraph for 
Maureen Ramsey’s citation of luck egalitarians who attempt 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cases in which the parties concerned are not fully responsible 
for their own situation, and excluding them from the harsh 
treatment.
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when she writes that a luck egalitarian “system requires 
the state to make grossly intrusive … judgments of 
individual’s choices. Equality of fortune thus interferes 
with citizens’ privacy” (1999, 310). And, for instance, 
Ramsay levels the second and third charges: the second, 
when she claims that even if we could disentangle luck 
from choice, in political philosophy any “procedure 
[used to accurately determine the extent of people’s 
responsibility] would be … prohibitively costly” (2005, 
446, my emphasis); and the third when she claims that 
Rawls and Dworkin do not satisfactorily disentangle 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and she frames Arneson, Cohen and Roemer’s positions 
as unsuccessful6 attempts to find a better way of 
negotiating the “inter-relatedness between abilities and 
ambitions” (2005, 434).
However, these objections are also rather counter-
product ive,  because they too sound more l ike 
endorsements of what luck egalitarians are saying 
rather than like genuine critiques. After all, no effort 
is made here to resist the basic assertion that this is 
how those people who are responsible for their own 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ?????? ???????
but rather there is only the sad resignation or lament that 
unfortunately we will not be able to treat them as we 
ought to because doing so would either result in a terribly 
intrusive society, in resource wastage, or because it is 
simply humanly impossible to untangle luck and choice 
from one another. And although these objections have not 
gone unaddressed by the theorists whose positions they 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
mention various luck egalitarian responses which in my 
????????????? ????????????????????????? ??? ?????????? ??????
that much of this back-and-forth argument is wasted 
effort because these objections miss the main point in the 
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
could not meet those objections, those who raise them 
would still have to concede that luck egalitarians’ hearts 
are in the right place because if only we could disentangle 
choice from luck in an economically efficient way 
and without unduly intruding into people’s lives, then 
we should after all do precisely what luck egalitarians 
recommend, and thus the only thing that saves people’s 
bacon are these annoying practical limitations!
Finally, some critics also argue that when it comes 
to such things as organ transplant decisions, those 
6 On her account, neither Arneson, Cohen nor Roemer 
offers us an acceptable way to “separate out the relative 
contributions of heredity, environment and voluntary 
?????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ???????????
advantaged or disadvantaged because of their own actions or 
behaviour” (Ramsay 2005, 444).
decisions should only ever be made on the basis of 
clinical considerations????????????????????????????????????
transplant recipient’s health problems can be treated 
using a less intrusive method (e.g. living a healthier 
lifestyle or perhaps taking certain medications), or 
whether they are likely to resist the temptation to 
drink alcohol after their surgery, or even by assessing 
???????????????????????????? ?????? ???????????????????????
rather than on the basis of whether one person is more 
responsible for their present need for a liver transplant 
than another person (e.g. Neuberger 1999; Beresford 
2001). However, this response seems to ignore the 
problem rather than dealing with it, since in a climate 
??? ??????????? ???? ??????????????????????????? ?? ??????
transplant than the number of livers that are available, 
and more money could always be thrown at the public 
??????? ??????? ????????? ?????????? ????? ????????
difficult choices between cases which are otherwise 
identical except for the fact that one person is apparently 
more responsible for the fact that they are now deprived 
than another, and the question that needs answering 
is whether in such cases it is legitimate to use such 
considerations as tie-breakers.
In my opinion the critics’ position is not strong. 
Firstly, nobody denies that luck egalitarianism will 
sometimes be harsh, but on the luck egalitarian account 
that harshness is not excessive because that is simply 
????? ???????? ??? ????? ?? ????? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????? ????
uncaring. Secondly, luck egalitarians can accommodate 
the critics’ complaints about mis-attributions of 
????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
case this objection offers little solace to those who are 
(partially) responsible for their own deprivations, since 
it does not protect them from being treated in a second- 
or third-rate manner. Thirdly, the intrusive, wasteful 
and intertwined objections sound more like sad laments 
about the practical difficulties associated with treating 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
like endorsements of what luck egalitarians are saying 
?? ??????? ????? ????? ???????? ???????????????? ??????????
even if we accept the claim that clinical considerations 
should play the most important role in informing medical 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
choices when we are faced with clinically identical 
cases, and what critics would have to explain is why 
considerations of responsibility should not be used as 
tie-breakers in such cases. For these reasons I find the 
objections that critics level at luck egalitarianism to be 
either unconvincing or misguided.
2.2. Problems with the luck-egalitarian position
However, this should not be taken as an endorsement of 
the luck egalitarian position; I shall now offer two minor 
and one main argument against luck egalitarianism.
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First of all, there is reason to be weary of the reply 
that was offered earlier to the harshness objection on 
???? ???????????????????????????? ????? ?????????? ????? ????????
is simply like that (cold, stark and uncaring), and 
hence that for this reason there is nothing unjust about 
abandoning people who were responsible for their own 
disadvantages to suffer the consequences of their own 
actions. In essence, the problem with this reply is that it 
merely asserts, rather than establishing, that the proper 
concern of justice is narrow (i.e. that justice need only 
concern itself with responsibility-tracking) rather than 
wide (i.e. that a plurality of considerations inform what 
is just and what is not). Without dwelling on this issue, 
my point is simply that one way to interpret the critics’ 
harshness objection is as an objection to the narrow 
????????????????? ?????????? ??????????????? ????????????? ????
sorts of considerations which we take to be relevant 
??????????????????? ?????????????? ????????????????? ??????
objection in this way then this reply will simply beg the 
question against their position.7
Secondly, although luck egalitarians have indeed 
refined their positions to take account of the various 
??????????? ?????????????????? ????????????????? ???????????
instance, they recognize that people’s responsibility 
can be undermined by such things as constitutional and 
??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ad-hoc. For instance, although one reason to not reduce 
people’s entitlements to (e.g.) healthcare even when 
those people happen to be responsible for their current 
health deprivations might indeed be that doing so may 
reduce their ability to be responsible agents in the future, 
technically any prejudicial treatment of a person (i.e. 
irrespective of whether it has to do with the provision 
of healthcare or of some other benefit) may reduce 
people’s range of future life options, and that in turn 
may adversely affect their ability to be fully responsible 
agents in the future. But since we do not take this to be a 
reason to refrain from tracking responsibility in all cases, 
it is not clear why we should take this to be a reason to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that luck egalitarians wish to exclude (e.g. healthcare) 
from the harsh treatment. As Stemplowska points out, 
“people often disagree over which disadvantages are 
acceptable” (2009, 239), and my worry is that once we 
allow ourselves to exclude one domain of disadvantages 
from the responsibility-tracking rule, then there will 
be no principled way of excluding other domains of 
disadvantage as well.
However, most importantly, the third reason why I 
7 The distinction between a narrow and a wide understanding 
of justice is brought to mind for instance by Zofia 
Stemplowska’s comparison of “all-things-considered justice” 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
find fault with the luck egalitarian position is because 
I think that the responsibility-tracking intuition upon 
?????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ?????????? ???????????? ???????
take responsibility for those things for which they were 
responsible, and that no one is entitled to expect others 
??? ????? ????? ??????????????? ???? ??????? ??? ??????? ????????
in justification. In what follows, I will first argue that 
claims about what outcomes or states of affairs people 
are/were responsible for having brought about refer to a 
very different kind of responsibility concept than claims 
about taking responsibility. Secondly, I will argue that 
since these two claims refer to two different kinds of 
responsibility concepts, that claims about the former kind 
of responsibility need not necessarily entail anything 
about the latter kind of responsibility. On my account, if 
we wish to deduce conclusions about how people should 
be treated from premises about what they have done, 
then some kind of normative bridging premises will need 
to be cited. But since normative premises themselves 
?????? ??????????? ???????????????? ???? ???????????????????
just state that all murderers should be executed without 
citing any supporting arguments, because as the literature 
on this topic has shown while utilitarian considerations 
may support treating people in one way, deontological 
considerations may justify completely different sort of 
???????????? ??? ??? ?????????????? ??????????? ???????????????
that someone was responsible for their own ill health 
will automatically lead to the harsh conclusion that their 
entitlements to have that deprivation remedied should 
now be reduced.8
(i) Six different responsibility concepts
Responsibility is more of a “syndrome” than it is a single 
concept, or put another way, there is not just one single 
concept which answers to the name “responsibility”, 
but rather there are many different though related 
concepts each of which under various circumstances 
???????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????
legitimately answers to that name. To see this, consider 
this parable about Smith the ship captain (adapted from 
Kutz 2004, 549; adapted from Hart 1968, 211):
(1) Smith had always been an exceedingly responsible 
person, (2) and as captain of the ship he was responsible 
for the safety of his passengers and crew. However, on 
his last voyage he drank himself into a stupor, (3) and he 
was responsible for the loss of his ship and many lives. 
(4) Smith’s defense attorney argued that the alcohol 
8 Despite some superficial similarities between Feiring’s 
(2008) recent argument and the argument which I will 
present here, our arguments are in fact very different 
because while Feiring’s claims are based on Hurley’s (2002) 
previously-cited analysis of what we ought to do about 
involuntary disadvantages, my analysis relates to voluntary 
disadvantages.
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and Smith’s transient depression were responsible 
for his misconduct, (5) but the prosecution’s medical 
experts confirmed that Smith was fully responsible 
when he started drinking since he was not suffering 
from depression at that time. (6) Alas, his employer 
will probably have to take responsibility for this 
tragedy, since the victims families’ claims for damages 
far outstrip the limits of Smith’s personal indemnity 
insurance policy.
The word “responsibility” is used in this passage 
in at least six different ways. First, there is a claim 
about his virtue responsibility??????????????????????
a dependable person, someone who took their duties 
seriously, and who normally did the right thing. Second, 
there is a claim about Smith’s role responsibility??? ???
his role as the ship’s captain Smith had certain duties 
to various parties, both on and off his ship (these are 
sometimes referred to as our “responsibilities”). Third, 
there is a claim about his outcome responsibility??? ??? ???
alleged that various states of affairs or outcomes, such 
as the loss of the ship and many of its passengers and 
crew, are rightfully attributable to him, as something 
that he did. Fourth, there are two claims about causal 
responsibility? ?????????????????? ??????? ???????? ?????
Smith’s aberrant behaviour was caused by the alcohol 
and by his depression. Fifth, there is a claim about 
Smith’s capacity responsibility???????????????????????
suffering from depression at that time, the prosecution 
therefore argued that his mental capacities were fully 
functional, and hence that his moral agency was fully 
intact. And finally, comments are made about liability 
responsibility?????????????????????????????????????????
to “take” due responsibility for what has happened; in 
this case financial liability is mentioned because this 
is apparently one way in which responsibility might 
be “taken”, but we might also suppose that to take due 
personal responsibility Smith should also apologise to 
the bereaved families and then spend a term in prison.9
(ii) Backward-looking and forward-looking 
responsibility concepts
However, these various responsibility concepts can be 
roughly apportioned into the following three groups, the 
last two of which are particularly relevant to the point 
which I wish to make: while some of them are largely 
descriptive (i.e. virtue- and capacity responsibility), 
others look backwards in time towards things which 
have allegedly already happened in the past (i.e. causal- 
and outcome responsibility), and others look forward in 
time towards things that allegedly ought to be done in the 
future (i.e. role- and liability responsibility).
9 For an indepth discussion of these different responsibility 
concepts as well as of the relationships which obtain 
between them see (Vincent 2006b and 2009).
Thomas Scanlon notices the different directional 
orientation of the concepts that fall into the latter two 
groups when he argues that “[t]o say that a person is 
responsible, in th[e backward-looking] sense, for a given 
action is only to say that it is appropriate to take [that 
action] as a basis of moral appraisal of that person[; 
on the other hand], judgments of responsibility [in the 
forward-looking sense] express substantive claims about 
what people are required ... to do for each other” (Scanlon 
1998, 248).10 Peter Cane and Antony Duff also note the 
different directional orientation of responsibility claims 
that fall into the latter two groups. For instance, Cane 
draws a distinction between attributions of what he calls 
“historical responsibility” which allocate responsibility 
to people “for past conduct”, and claims about what 
“prospective responsibilities” are imposed upon someone 
by the law (Cane 2004, 162). Cane argues that “[i]n a 
temporal sense, responsibility looks in two directions. 
Ideas such as accountability … look backwards to 
conduct and events in the past. ... By contrast, the 
ideas of roles and tasks look to the future, and establish 
obligations and duties” (Cane 2002, 31, my emphasis). 
On the other hand, Duff distinguishes “prospective 
responsibilities [which] are those I have before the event, 
those matters that it is up to me to attend to or take care 
of” and which look forward in time, from “retrospective 
responsibilities [which] are those I have after the event, 
for events or outcomes which can be ascribed to me as an 
agent” and look backwards in time (1998, 290-1, original 
emphasis).11 
I cite these different authors to show that even if 
we only carve up the domain of responsibility claims 
in the roughest of ways, we should at least notice 
?????? ????????? ????????? ??????????????? ???????? ?????
responsibility claims aim to report something about the 
past, other responsibility claims aim to make some sort 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in the sort of debates with which this article concerns 
itself, claims about what people are/were responsible 
for refer to a different kind of responsibility concept 
than claims about taking? ??????????????? ?? ????? ????
10 Scanlon uses the terms “responsibility as attributability” 
and “substantive responsibility”, but I think that these 
are equivalent to my outcome responsibility and liability 
responsibility respectively. Christopher Kutz (2004, 
549), Stephen Darwall (2006, 91-1, notes 5 and 7) and 
E. Feiring (2008, 36) also seem to interpret Scanlon as I 
have, and Feiring even adopts Scanlon’s term “substantive 
responsibility” to refer to this forward-looking responsibility 
concept.
11 Duff elaborates on this in a later article (2004-5). In actual 
fact, Cane and Duff carve up the domain of responsibility 
concepts somewhat differently to the way that I do, but at 
least the main idea that responsibility concepts can look in 
two temporal directions is the same.
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different responsibility concepts because they have very 
???????????????????????? ????? ????????? ??? ?????? ????? ????
responsibility-tracking intuition which states that if you 
are responsible for something then you (and not others) 
should take responsibility for it, cites two different 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in the anticedent and liability responsibility is cited in 
the consequent. Thus, a more accurate statement of the 
responsibility-tracking intuition would read something 
like this: if you are outcome responsible for something 
then you (rather than others) should take liability 
responsibility for it.
 (iii) The transition from outcome responsibility to 
liability responsibility
The reason why it is important to observe that the 
responsibility-tracking intuition makes use of two 
different responsibility concepts rather than just 
one generic responsibility concept, is because it is 
not obvious how consequent claims about liability 
responsibility are derived from anticedent claims about 
outcome responsibility.
One source of the problem here is that if these are 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in time and is used when we wish to report something 
about the past, and the other which looks forward in 
time and which is used to make prescriptive claims 
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
the former (i.e. outcome responsibility) tell us anything 
about the latter (i.e. liability responsibility). What sort 
of transition is it that is allegedly made when we move 
from the backwards-looking claim that some state of 
affairs is rightfully attributable to a particular person, to 
the forward-looking claim that this person should now 
respond by doing various things?
Is the idea meant to be that claims about liability 
responsibility are already contained within claims 
about outcome responsibility? Given that each of these 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
looks forward in time while the other looks backwards 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
also urges that it is crucially important to distinguish 
these senses of responsibility from one another, precisely 
because a failure to do so “leads to the view that if people 
are responsible ... for their actions [in the backwards-
looking sense] then they can properly be left to suffer the 
consequences of these actions”, or even that nobody else 
has the responsibility to help them. However, he argues 
that this conclusion “rests on the mistaken assumption 
that taking individuals to be responsible for their 
conduct [in the backwards-looking sense] ... requires 
one to also say that they are responsible for its results 
in the [forward-looking] sense” (Scanlon 1998, 293, 
my emphasis). On his account these are two separate 
?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
(liability) responsibility are not already contained within 
prior claims about their backward-looking (outcome) 
responsibility. Similarly, Robert Goodin also argues that 
“[t]ask responsibility [which appears to be the name that 
he gives to what I call liability responsibility] is often 
thought to flow, automatically (indeed, analytically), 
from blame responsibility [my outcome responsibility]. 
To determine whose responsibility it should be to correct 
some unfortunate state of affairs, we should on such 
logic simply determine who was responsible for having 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are responsible for causing an unfortunate situation are 
responsible for fixing it. ... Nothing, it seems, could be 
simpler, more analytically straightforward” (Schmidtz 
and Goodin 1999, 151). However, on subsequent pages he 
points out that it is far from obvious that this assumption 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Alternatively, is the idea perhaps meant to be that 
conclusions about liability responsibility are logically 
deduced from premises about outcome responsibility? 
A number of authors have argued that if this is indeed 
meant to be a logical transition, then it is one that 
will only be valid if we also include some normative 
bridging premises in the deduction. For instance, 
Howard Klepper has argued that since these are two 
very different responsibility concepts, the transition 
from claims about outcome responsibility to claims 
about liability responsibility must be some form of 
moral??????????????????????????????????????????????????
person’s outcome responsibility does not automatically 
entail any particular conclusion about their liability 
responsibility unless we also add some further moral 
premises about what duties befall those people who are 
outcome responsible for some kind of state of affairs 
(Klepper 1990, 235-9). However, if Klepper is right, 
then somewhere between our premises about outcome 
responsibility and the conclusions about liability 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
responsible parties. Hence, if we wish to derive claims 
about liability responsibility from premises about 
outcome responsibility, then we will also need to cite 
some further normative premises over and above claims 
about these parties’ outcome responsibility, and since 
the responsibility-tracking intuition assumes that this 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????? ??? ???????????
that those who are responsible should take responsibility 
????? ??????????????????????????
A related kind of problem with the responsibility-
tracking intuition can also be observed when we notice 
that claims about taking responsibility are not generic, 
because whenever someone claims that another person 
should take responsibility for something, they nearly 
?????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ??????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
they think it is their due to take. Suppose for instance that 
I am responsible for causing a car accident in which your 
child is seriously injured or maybe even killed; precisely 
how should I now take responsibility for what I have 
done? Exactly what should I now do in order to take 
the allegedly due responsibility? Would it be enough, 
for instance, if I just rang my insurer and arranged for 
them to compensate you for the medical and special care 
costs that you will now incur, or for the funeral costs, 
and perhaps a little extra to cover your family’s pain and 
suffering? No? Well, if that would be a bit too light, then 
perhaps I should instead (or also?) be made into your 
child’s permanent carer (if they survived); would that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
????????????
The point is that even if we agree that I should 
now take responsibility on account of having been 
responsible for your child’s misfortune (i.e. a position 
which I just rejected), we will still be very far from 
figuring out precisely how I should now take that 
responsibility, because this depends on a wide range of 
normative considerations which concern themselves 
with determining what would be an appropriate way 
of responding to this kind of tragedy.12 Thus, my 
second point is that even if we thought that claims 
about liability responsibility do automatically follow 
from (or are already contained within) premises about 
???????? ??????????????? ?? ????? ???????? ????? ???? ?????
normative bridging premises to deduce that someone 
should take responsibility from the fact that they were 
?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????how that 
responsibility should now be taken. 
Hence, there are at least two reasons to reject the 
responsibility-tracking intuition. Firstly, we have 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
about a person’s outcome responsibility entail that 
they should now take or accept liability responsibility. 
Secondly, even if claims about outcome responsibility 
alone had been sufficient for the derivation of 
conclusions about liability responsibility, then they 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????how 
12 For instance, Feiring also points out that “[i]t is ... not 
obvious exactly what [it] means” to say that “people should 
be held responsible for their medical condition in virtue 
of their prior conduct” (2008, 33, my emphasis). Serena 
Olsaretti has also recently argued that it is often far from 
clear precisely what the consequences of a person’s actions 
?? ????? ?????? ????????????? ????? ?????????? ???????????????
when they happen to be responsible for their own current 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
after the dices [sic] are tossed, [then] there would be no loss 
for the gambler to bear at all” (2009, 7).
the party in question should now take their liability 
responsibility. On my account, the fact that someone was 
outcome responsible for something entails neither that 
they should now take liability responsibility for it, nor 
that they should take liability responsibility for it in some 
???????????. Thus, for both of these reasons I urge that 
to derive conclusions about liability responsibility from 
premises about outcome responsibility, we must also 
make reference to some normative premises.
(iv) Reactive norms, the normative premises that 
bridge the gap
These premises which help bridge the inference gap 
between the backward-looking outcome responsibility 
and the forward-looking liability responsibility claims 
will presumably look something like this: those who 
are outcome responsible for X should take liability 
responsibility in manner Y. And given that the duties 
which these premises confer will befall only those who 
we have already established are???????????????????????
i.e. one will only ever incur those duties as a reaction 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????????
reactive norms, since they are norms that govern our 
reactions to outcome responsible parties.
Once reactive norms are added to this picture, it 
ceases to be a mystery how the transition from backward-
looking claims about outcome responsibility to forward-
looking conclusions about liability responsibility is made 
?? ???? ????? ????? ???? ??????????? ????????????????????????
the former are backward-looking is no longer a problem 
because reactive norms help bridge this temporal and 
logical inference gap. So, for instance, if one of our 
reactive norms stated that someone who is outcome 
responsible for another’s quadriplegia should become 
that person’s carer, then that is indeed what those who 
are outcome responsible for others’ quadriplegia could 
now be asked to do. Likewise, if another one of our 
reactive norms stated that those who slander others shall 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to those who slander others. Finally, if another one of 
our reactive norms stated that those who are outcome 
responsible for another’s losses shall compensate them 
for the full extent of those losses, then that too is how 
outcome responsible parties could be treated.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
of reactive norms
However, this now raises the question of where such 
reactive norms might come from, because even if we 
grant that some sort of normative premise is indeed 
required to bridge the gap between the backward-looking 
claims about outcome responsibility and forward-looking 
conclusions about liability responsibility, given that in 
the end such premises may justify treating people in 
various often-coercive ways, these premises must surely 
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???????????????????????????????????
To see how reactive norms might be justified, let us 
momentarily look at what goes on in debates within 
the criminal law where people address the question of 
whether (e.g.) the death penalty is a fitting sentence 
for certain criminal offences. This question is often 
approached from two different angles: while some 
approach this question from the utilitarian angle and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
if in the end their benefits (e.g. deterrence of others 
from committing similar crimes and prevention of 
those who have already committed those crimes from 
re-offending) will outweigh their costs (e.g. from a 
utilitarian perspective, killing a criminal is also an evil), 
others approach this question from the deontological 
angle and argue that such severe punishments can only 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
warrant them. However, putting these details aside, what 
I wish to highlight about this debate is that what people 
involved in it are doing is that they are trying to settle 
the question of whether a particular reactive norm of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(justice-based) arguments.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in a similar manner too. For instance, in tort law one 
reason why we might expect outcome responsible 
people to compensate their victims for their losses, is 
because of the deterrent effect that the knowledge that 
financial liability will be imposed onto us if we are 
found to be outcome responsible for another’s losses 
????? ????? ??? ??????????? ???????? ?? ????? ???????????
people will take greater care while driving. Or, this 
same reactive norm might also be argued for by citing 
the alleged requirements of corrective justice, and here 
there is plenty of room for disagreement about whether 
corrective justice supports this reactive norm or not. 
Never the less, this discussion is only intended to provide 
a sketch of what role arguments about justice or utility 
(and presumably other normative considerations such 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
our beliefs about what reactive norms there is most 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
needed to support drawing subsequent conclusions about 
how people should be treated (i.e. about their liability 
responsibility) from earlier claims about what they 
have allegedly done (i.e. on account of their outcome 
responsibility).
(vi) The relevance of the above discussion for my 
assessment of luck egalitarianism
I have argued that it is far from clear that if you are 
responsible for something then you should now take 
responsibility for it, or that you should take responsibility 
for it in some specific way. On my account, to be 
justified in deducing conclusions about how people 
should be treated from premises about what those people 
are responsible for having done, we must also cite 
some relevant reactive norms, and those norms must 
themselves be justified through normative arguments. 
But since luck egalitarians assume that the transition 
from outcome responsibility to liability responsibility 
??? ???????????????????? ????? ??????????????????? ????? ??????
responsibility-tracking as a default position from which 
?????????????????????????????????????????qua departures 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????
Put another way, on my account luck egalitarians 
should not be as quick as Rakowski and Arneson to 
reduce the entitlements of those people who were 
outcome responsible for their own deprivations, 
because normative considerations also have a role to 
play in determining whether this should indeed be 
done or not, and these considerations are intrinsic to 
?????????????????????????? ????? ??????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
distractions from that project’s main concerns. While 
luck egalitarians assume that people’s entitlements 
should automatically track their outcome responsibility, 
on my account this is not automatic for two reasons: 
firstly, it is not automatic that people’s entitlements 
should track their outcome responsibility because 
whether someone’s outcome responsibility should 
affect their entitlements or not depends on a possibly 
wide range of normative considerations, and some of 
these may recommend against doing this; and secondly, 
because it is also plausible that outcome responsibility 
may only be relevant to other aspects of how outcome 
responsible parties should be treated, but not to their 
entitlements per se.13
3. Misgivings about the Debate
Although I find fault with both sides’ positions, my 
critique of the luck egalitarians’ position has broader 
consequences for the debate treated as a whole.
To see this, notice that two features are common to 
much of the discussion that I summarized in the first 
half of this paper. Firstly, considerations which tame the 
alleged harshness of the luck egalitarian commitment 
13 For instance, we may instead decide that those who are 
outcome responsible for their own ill health should be 
compelled to attend compulsory cooking classes, or that they 
should be involuntarily committed to drug detoxification 
clinics, but that they should still all get the same sort of 
medical treatment as others who are not responsible for their 
similar ill health.
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to responsibility are often conceived of by both sides 
to this debate as exclusions, constraints or restraints 
on the default responsibility-tracking rule which states 
that the degree of a person’s responsibility for their own 
situation should to some extent determine the degree of 
their entitlement to receive public assistance, and the 
legitimacy of expecting some to contribute to funding 
the provision of such assistance to others. And secondly, 
depending on whether one is an advocate or a critic of 
luck egalitarianism, these exclusions, constraints and 
restraints are seen as either effective or ineffective, and as 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
the responsibility-tracking intuition is correct, then both 
of these features are problematic because considerations 
which tame the harshness of the responsibility-tracking 
rule are not external constraints that are imposed upon 
responsibility from the outside, but rather they are 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
source of the reactive norms which mediate the transition 
from backward-looking claims about what a person is 
allegedly responsible for having done or brought about, 
to forward-looking claims about how (and even that) 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
such considerations along these two dimensions (i.e. as 
effective/ineffective exclusions to- and as justified/not 
justified departures from an otherwise legitimate 
responsibility-tracking norm) is also inappropriate. Put 
another way, if my rejection of the responsibility-tracking 
intuition is correct, then the demands of responsibility 
????? ???? ?? ???????? ????? ???????? ?? ?????????????? ????
demands of these other normative considerations, 
because responsibility only provides a formal structure 
within which those other normative considerations 
determine how people may be treated, but contrary to 
what most people seem to think, responsibility does 
not generate practical demands of its own which might 
conflict with other normative considerations and which 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
other considerations.
This critique of the standard way in which debates 
about luck egalitarianism are carried out is useful for 
two reasons. First, it helps to explain precisely why 
the harshness objection is not merely a lament about 
the cold, stark and uncaring nature of justice (i.e. an 
outsider’s lament about the unkindness of justice), 
but rather why it is indeed as I suggested above an 
objection to luck-egalitarianism on grounds of justice 
(i.e. an insider’s complaint about the unjustness of luck-
egalitarianism). The harshness objection is a justice-
?????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
i.e. claims like “this is too harsh”, and their supporting 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
from claims about a person’s outcome responsibility 
to conclusions about their liability responsibility, 
and so such claims should be taken seriously by luck 
egalitarians. Although it may indeed turn out that 
people’s treatment should in some way be affected by 
their outcome responsibility, it is far from clear either 
that or precisely how their outcome responsibility should 
affect their treatment because these things depend to a 
large extent on a wide range of normative considerations.
Second, as regards debates about how smokers, 
alcoholics the obese and others in similar situations 
should be treated, the foregoing discussion entails 
that more effort should be devoted (on all sides in this 
debate) to exploring the reasons which allegedly support 
treating outcome responsible parties in various ways, 
because on my account the mere fact that someone is 
outcome responsible for their own ailment (where this 
is indeed the case) can never be sufficient to by itself 
establish either that they (rather than society) should 
now take responsibility for their own ill health, nor to 
tell us precisely how they should take that responsibility. 
Unfortunately, both sides in this debate have tended to 
assume that the only point which needs to be settled is 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
i.e. whether alcoholics, smokers, the obese and others 
are??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and so debates about whether such people are outcome 
responsible for their own situation or not tend to occupy 
centre stage in this area. But on my account, even if 
eventually both sides in this debate came to agree on 
who is outcome responsible for their own ill health and 
about the extent of their outcome responsibility for it, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
about how those people should be treated, because it is 
far from clear that what should now happen (if they are 
to take due responsibility for their actions) is that such 
people’s access to publicly funded health care should 
be restricted. In essence, it is far from clear that even 
if smokers, alcoholics and the obese all turn out to be 
outcome responsible for their own ill health, then they 
should have their access to public health care restricted 
to take account of their responsibility, because this is just 
as much a normative issue as it is a matter of whether 
they were responsible for their own ill health or not.
4. Conclusion
Many modern luck egalitarian theories rest on the claim 
that to obtain/maintain equality we must preserve the 
effects of choice while eliminating the effects of luck; 
on the luck egalitarian account, to treat people as equals 
we need not eradicate all departures from strict equality 
but only some, since people who are responsible for 
their own departure from strict equality should, wherever 
possible, be left alone. However, this claim presupposes 
some version of the responsibility-tracking intuition, and 
I have argued that this intuition is remiss because the 
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mere fact that someone was responsible for some state of 
???????? ????????????? ????????????????????? that they should 
now take responsibility for it, nor that they should now 
take responsibility for it in some specific way. On my 
account, to establish either of these things, in addition 
to premises about what someone was responsible for 
bringing about, we also need premises about what ought 
to be done to/by people who happen to be responsible for 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ???????
need to realize that the role which those premises play 
in generating practical conclusions about how people 
should be treated is not as external constraints imposed 
upon the harsh demands of responsibility, but rather that 
they are the very sources of the practical demands of 
responsibility.
In a way, on my account people are entitled to say: “So 
what that I’m responsible for my own ill health? In itself, 
this shows neither that I should now take responsibility 
for my own ill health, nor does it tell us how I should 
now take this responsibility.” To justify substantive 
claims about how people should be treated on account 
of the fact that they are responsible for something, we 
need a lot more than just claims about what they are 
???????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
debate, and we should be a lot clearer about what role 
that normative debate will play in generating practical 
conclusions about how we may treat one another.1
Endnote
 This paper is an extended and revised version of the paper 
“Taking responsibility for voluntary disadvantages” which 
was published in the Proceedings of the Third International 
Applied Ethics Conference in Sapporo (2008, 297-312). It 
contains ideas and some text from the author’s PhD thesis 
Responsibility, Compensation and Accident Law Reform 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
nally presented in 2006 at the Australian Society of Legal 
Philosophy conference at the University of Auckland, New 
Zealand in a paper entitled “A Critique of Responsibility-
Tracking Egalitarianism”.
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Editorial Note
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